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RECENT DECISIONS
Automobiles-Liability of Parent Consenting to Child's Use of Car, for

Injuries Caused-What Disobedience of Child to Parent's Directions Vitiates
Consent.-On November 1, 1937, defendant Austin Hartman, while driving his
father's automobile, crashed into an electric light pole in the city of Detroit,
causing injuries to a passenger, resulting in his death. Suit was brought by the
administrator of the decedent against Austin,, and his father Anthony, for
damages resulting from the son's alleged negligence. It appeared that the father
consented to the son's using the car to go to work, but told him not to carry
passengers for hire. Despite the father's instructions, the son made a practice of
taking fellow workers along at a daily charge. The trial court found that no
cause of action existed against the father, but held the son liable. On appeal
held, the father was liable, under Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) Sec. 4648, which
which makes a father liable for injuries resulting from the negligent operation
of an automobile, if automobile is driven with his consent. The gist of the
liability is the consent given by the owner to another to operate an instrumentality of danger. on a highway. The statutory liability predicated upon the
owner's consent holds, even though the instructions of the owner are violated.
Sweeney v. Hartman et al., 296 N.W. 282 (Mich. 1941).
The principal case differs from another Michigan case which the court cited,
interpreting the same statute. Christiansen v. Hilber, 282 Mich. 403, 276 N.W.
495 (1937). In this case, a father who owned a truck which was used in his
business authorized his son to drive it in carrying out the business enterprise.
The son was told only to take it when "we needed it." In using the truck for
pleasure purposes without his father's consent, the son had an accident resulting
in injury to another. It was held that the father had never given consent to the
use of the truck for any but business purposes, and that at the time of the
accident the son had not been authorized to use the truck. In this case there was
no consent given to operate the truck at any time, except for business purposes. It seems difficult to find what facts do or do not vitiate the consent of
the owner. Is it the violation of the instruction as to a (a) use or (b) mode of
operation? The court's interpretation of the Christiansen case, supra, in the
principal case would indicate that it is the former in Michigan.
In New York there is a statute (Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol. Laws,
Sec. 59, C. 71) which imposes liability upon the owner of every motor vehicle
for death or personal injuries resulting from negligence in the operation of the
motor vehicle by any person legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner. The statute was interpreted in
Arcara v. Moresse, 179 N.E. 389 (N.Y. 1932) where the plaintiff was injured
by a collision with the defendant's car, which the defendant had loaned to his
nephew, Maggio. Maggio was in the car at the time of the accident, but the
car was driven by Barone, with Maggio's consent. The owner of the car had
given Maggio instructions not to let Barone or any other person, other than
himself, drive or operate the vehicle. Despite the fact that Maggio was disobeying the instructions, the owner was held liable, because Maggio at the time
was using the car with the owner's consent. The court stated: "If the limiting
instructions relate to the manner of operation, such as speeding, or careless
pilotage of the car, though the instructions be disobeyed, nevertheless the use
is with permission of the owner." Here the thing forbidden was considered to
be related to the operation of the car, not to the use which might be made of
it. The differentiation appears to be the same as that of the principal case.
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The New York Supreme Court found a father not liable under similar reasoning in Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929). The owner
of the car had allowed his son to use it to go to Long Island, but strictly forbade
him to go into Manhattan. The accident happened while the son was driving in
Manhattan, contrary to his father's directions. The court held that the son was
using the automobile at the time of the accident without the consent of his
father, since the use of the car was not in conformity with instructions. The
father was not liable under the statute.
In Robinson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 251 N.W. 613 (Ia. 1933), the plaintiff was injured when the car in which she was driving collided with a car
owned by the defendant and driven by one of its salesmen. The defendant instructed all salesmen not to use their cars for other than business purposes.
When the accident happened, the salesman was on his way to pitch a baseball
game. Defendant was held not liable under Iowa Code (1931) Sec. 5026, which
provides that "in all cases where damage is done by the car, driven b3f consent
of the owner, by reason of negligence of the driver, the owner of the car shall
be liable for such damage." The court considered that the salesman was not
driving with the consent of the defendant since the permission did not extend
to use for other than business purposes.
In some states where no statute exists, there appears to be similar policy.
In Roberts v. Vacca et al., 7 N.J. 865, 147 Atl. 463 (1929), the son had his father's
permission to use the car and take three women home. When the accident happened, the son was driving south-west instead of north-east, the direction necessary to reach the women's abode. The father was not held liable. In Shefts
et al. v. Free et al., 146 Atl. 185 (N.J. 1929), the son worked for his father. He
had been directed to put a truck in the garage. The son went past the garage
to a drug store for his own purposes; the accident happened while he was returning to the garage. The father was held not liable. In Wilson et al. v. Mason
et al., 147 Atl. 235 (N.J. 1929), the son had asked the father to allow him to use
the car to go to church. After going to church, the son took a drive with two
friends, going in a direction away from their homes. While he was on this
drive, the accident happened. The father was not held liable. This group of
cases seems to apply the distinction between mode of operation and use of
the car. In each case, the use of the car by the sons was prohibited or at least
not consented to. In another case, Jones v. Cook, 123 S.E. 407 (W.Va. 1924), the
defendant allowed his seventeen-year old step daughter to use his car to participate in a local high school parade, after which she went for a pleasure drive
with some friends, during which the accident happened. The father was held
liable. Here, despite the fact that there was disobedience as to the use of the
car and not merely as to instructions concerning the operation, the owner was
held liable. In all the cases previously discussed where the father was held
not liable because his directions had been disobeyed and his consent to drive
was therefore considered vitiated, the car would not have been in the place
where it was at the time of the accident if the directions had been obeyed.
While this is also true in Jones v. Cook, supra, the court there held the parent
liable, because the drive was the natural and probable consequences of the
child's expressly authorized use of the car for the parade. Under this reasoning, it would appear that a father would generally be responsible for injuries
occurring when his child drives his automobile, so long as permission was given
for some purpose, although that purpose was willfully departed from.
In Galpin v. Fisher, 192 N.W. 205 (Neb. 1923), the defendant owner furnished his son with a car to drive to school, with instructions to leave the car
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in a garage and then drive directly home after school. The father knew of the
son's previous disobedience. On this occasion, the son took the car out of the
garage before school started and while driving "around town" struck and
injured the plaintiff. The father was held liable under these instructions: "If
the son had deviated materially and substantially from the instructions so given
him, then the defendant would not be liable, but if the deviation had been only
slight, then such deviation would not of itself relieve the defendant from
liability." This case, too, appears to apply a rationale somewhat different from
the majority of the cases previously discussed.
In Wisconsin, the owner of an automobile is not liable whether he gives
his consent to his child to drive or not, unless there can be proved a master
and servant or principal and agency relationship. In Geffert v. Kayser, 179 Wis.
571, 192 N.W. 26 (1923), the son procured his father's permission to take the
car for the purpose of taking a friend to a dance. He was on his way from his
father's home to the residence where he was to call for her at the time the
accident occurred. The court, in holding the father not liable, stated that unless
the son is acting as an agent of the father, the father is not liable. See, also,
Crosset v. Goelzer, 177 Wis. 455, 188 N.W. 627 (1922) ; Hopkins v. Droppers, 184
Wis. 400, 198 N.W. 738 (1924).
From the foregoing, it is apparent that, in states other than those applying
the Wisconsin rule, it is difficult to determine the liability of a parent for
accidents occurring while a child is driving the parent's automobile. The tenor
of decisions sems to be that a "use" of the car other than that authorized by the
parent relieves him from liability for resulting injury, but a mere disobedience
of "instructions" as to the mode of driving, carrying of passengers, and the like,
is not sufficient to free the parent from liability, either under pertinent automobile statutes or the common law. It is difficult, however, to determine what
is a forbidden "use" and what is merely a disobedience of "instructions."
RoBERT S. WRZESiNSla.

Domestic Relations-Validity of Contract Releasing Husband of Duty to
Support his Wife.-In 1930, pending a separation action, the parties entered
into an agreement whereby the wife released certain property interests and sole
custody of the children. The husband agreed to pay a lump sum of $3,000 and
the wife agreed to accept this payment "in full satisfaction for all claim of support and maintenance of all kind." The money was paid and the separation
action was abandoned. Ten years later the wife brought this action for divorce
and petitioned for alimony. The trial court granted her $7 a week alimony, but
the husband objected to this and claimed he was released forever from the
duty of support because of their former agreement. The Appellate division
affirmed the divorce decree but modified it by striking out the provision for
support on the ground that alimony was barred by the separation agreement
between the parties.
Held: Judgment of the Appellate division reversed and that of the trial
court affirmed. The existence of a separation agreement in full satisfaction of
all claim of support does not preclude an award of alimony. Although husband
and wife may freely contract with one another, "a husband and wife cannot
contract . . . to relieve the husband from his liability to support his wife."
(Domestic Relations Law, Consol. Laws (1896) Ch. 15 #51.) The court considered the contract to be an attempt by the husband to purchase exemption
from his duty of support. The agreement was held not to be within the rule

